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Abstract: As the consolidation of financial institutions is one of the highlights in recent financial territory, 
we examine whether banks being subordinated under the financial holding company (FHCs) outperform 
to independent banks in Taiwan, covering 15 FHCs banks and 18 independent banks in our sample for the 
period from 2005 to 2010. Using the CAMEL approach, we also investigate empirically further the 
financial determinants of banks’ performance regarding FHCs banks and independent banks respectively, 
and examine whether the financial determinants of banks’ performance differ before and after the 
financial crisis. Results show that ROA is strongly related to certain CAMEL ratios, such as the total capital 
ratio, loan loss reserve/gross loans, the burden ratio, and net interest income divided by total assets. 
Moreover, the positive significant capital adequacy ratio in the post-crisis period in our sample is mainly 
driven by subordinated banks. Finally, asset quality factor has explaining power for the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods, meaning prevention safety net built predominantly in refraining from external shocks.    
 
Keywords: Financial holding company, CAMEL approach, financial crisis, banking industry, market 
structure. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The establishment of financial holding companies (FHCs) could promote economies of scale and enable 
the banking sector to compete more efficiently. With most of countries having a bank-based financial 
system, it virtually draws attention on determining factors for profitability in the banking sector. In 
Taiwan, how to make optimal use of the resources available and improve operational efficiency remains 
challenge. Research on determinants of bank profitability is extensive. However, little is known about the 
Taiwanese banking system due to the relative numerous and small, size of FHCs, yet complete diversified 
structure in Taiwan compared to other Asian countries. For example, the three largest banks in both Hong 
Kong and Singapore have a total market share of more than 80%, whereas none of the 15 FHCs in Taiwan 
have a market share of more than 10%. Before the 1990s, Taiwan’s financial sector was subject to 
government relations, and all banks were either owned or partly owned by the government. Since then, 
the financial sector began its reform towards liberalization and the financial market became more 
competitive. In 1991, the government started selling their shares in the commercial banking sector, and 
further invited domestic and foreign investors to participate in the banking industry. After liberalization, 
the number of domestic banks had increased from 24 in 1990 to 53 in 2001. The average rate of ROE 
dropped from 20.79% in 1990 to 3.61% in 2001. Non-performing loans rose from 0.93% of total loans in 
1990 to 7.48% in 2001 (Liu and Hsu, 2006). Bank profits immensely declined due to tough market 
competition. During the Asian financial crisis, the government underwent several significant reforms in 
order to solve overbanking problem. For instance, in 2000, the promulgation of Financial Institutions 
Merger Law provided both tax and non-tax incentives for financial institutions to merge on their own 
initiative, and to improve the overall operational efficiency and financial soundness within the system. 
Given the potential benefit of cross-selling, sharing information technology and e-commerce platforms, 
the financial holding company structure was expected to reduce cost and enhance revenue. As till 2010, 
15 FHCs have begun operating in Taiwan and one commercial bank (Chang Hwa Commercial Bank) 
controlled by majority stock shares of a FHC (Taishin International Financial Holdings) constitute the 
major component of the domestic financial market. In addition to banks’ performance, whether a sound 
and profitable financial banking system is more sustainable to ensure market stability from any negative 
shocks, such as the US subprime crisis is essential. This paper uses panel data approach covering more 
recent period of data from 2005 to 2010. We subgroup the data into the pre-crisis and post-crisis period 
based on profitability. The rest of this paper proceeds as following. Section 2 reviews the academic 
literature. Section 3 is the empirical mode design. Section 4 focuses on CAMEL ratios to explore 
empirically the determinants of bank performance. Section 5 gives the concluding remarks.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) is a financial institution engaged in nonbanking activities, 
offering customers a wide range of financial services. In 1999, the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA) allowed commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to 
consolidate for the US banking industry. Since then, FHCs and their subsidiaries integrated to engage in a 
host of new activities like brokerage, advisory, and underwriting. Whether establishing or joining in a 
FHCs is more profitable remains an important issue in empirical studies. For example, the “synergy 
hypothesis” suggests that joining in or establishing a FHCs, subsidiaries under them may have the 
potential to possess lower costs due to cooperative efforts, and to increase economics of scale and scope 
through cross-selling, resource sharing and efficient capital allocation. This would save customers 
considerable time and effort; perhaps even less transaction costs, compared to shopping from specialty 
firms. On the contrary, the alternative view which claims that independent banks (those not subordinated 
under FHCs) if standing firm on their core banking business, would secure specialization advantages and 
lower systematic risks. We propose this as the “specialization view”. Regarding “synergy hypothesis”, 
those in favor of the include Kwan (1998), who documents that Section 20 subsidiaries are typically more 
risky and not necessarily more profitable than their commercial bank affiliates and concludes possibly 
that some diversification benefits may exist for commercial banks because of the low return correlation 
between securities and bank subsidiaries. Mishkin (1999) and Berger et al. (1999) point out the financial 
consolidation across activities might lower the portfolio risk and the likelihood of financial firm failure. 
DeYoung and Roland (2001)find that revenue volatility and a higher degree of total leverage increase with 
a shift toward fee-based activities for commercial banks, implying greater earnings volatility. Shen and 
Chang (2007) compare the CAMEL indicators between samples of banks subordinated under FHCs and 
Independent banks in Taiwan for periods 2002-2006, with consideration to the ceteris paribus condition 
and also mitigating the sample selection bias. They discover that, on average, banks subordinated under 
FHCs outperform independent banks on indicators such as the capital adequacy, asset quality, earning 
ability and liquidity. Chang and Elyasiani (2008) investigate whether insurance activities (underwriting 
and agency) enhance the financial performance of FHCs in the U.S.  
 
Using quarterly panel observations of 510 FHCs over the period of 2003-2005, they reach two results. 
First, risk-adjusted return of FHCs is positively associated with a shift toward non-interest activities. 
Second, when disaggregating the sample by FHC size, risk-adjusted return is positively associated with 
insurance agency activities in small-sized FHCs and positively associated with insurance underwriting 
activities in large-sized FHCs. Their finding is that both small and large FHCs can reap from diversification 
benefits as long as they choose the right niche. Lo and Lu (2009) focus on the efficiency of profitability 
and marketability to evaluate the FHCs’ performance in Taiwan. Their results indicate that the large-sized 
FHCs perform better than small-sized ones, implying that large-sized FHCs generate higher profits due to 
their large-scaled assets. And in terms of marketability performance, large-sized FHCs also operate better 
than small-sized ones, which can be explained by the finding that large FHCs can more easily attract the 
attention of investors with the trend towards the consolidation of financial institutions. Those who don’t 
totally agree with the synergy view are Templeton and Severiens (1992), who investigate 54 bank holding 
companies from 1979 to 1986 and find diversification (the share of market value not attributed to bank 
assets) is associated with lower volatility of shareholder equity returns. Morgan and Samolyk (2003) 
document diversification is not associated with greater returns (ROE or ROA) or reduced risk. Stiroh and 
Rumble (2005) find evidence that though diversification benefits do exist between FHCs in the U.S., but 
gains are offset by the increased exposure to non-interest activities, which are much more volatile, but not 
necessarily more profitable than interest-generating activities. Their findings also show that within FHCs, 
marginal increases in revenue diversification are not associated with performance, which may reflect 
either a change in managerial focus or simply the endogenous nature of the diversification decision. In 
contrast, marginal increases in non-interest income still imply a robust declining relationship with 
risk-adjusted profits. Chiou (2009) also investigates the determinants of efficiency and productivity 
changes of banks in Taiwan, and examine whether banks being subordinated to FHCs could really 
promote their efficiency and productivity. By applying the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach to 
calculate for bank efficiency and a total factor productivity index to measure the productivity of banks, the 
results show that except for pure technical efficiency, other efficiencies and productivity of the banks have 
not improved because of their establishment or joining in FHCs. On the contrary, it is because of their 
before existing better efficiency that allow them to establish or join in a FHC in the first place.  
 
Hwang et al. (2009) take into consideration of both financial and non-financial performance indices of 35 
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banks in Taiwan. They divide their samples into new and old banks (based on the year founded), and into 
public and private banks (according to the types of major sponsors). Results show that for the years of 
2000 and 2001, privatized government - owned banks with significantly higher financial performance 
indices than private banks, but both types of banks are not significantly different from each other in 
non-financial performance indices. As for new and old banks, both are not significantly different from 
each other in neither financial nor non-financial performance indices. They suggest that in order to 
increase bank profits, managers should aim to improve its capital structure, solvency and bank 
management, rather than establishing more bank branches. As the emphasis on non-interest income 
bears fewer risk and has more future power grows, banks in Taiwan have currently started to expand into 
the non-interest business in seek of a more profitable source of revenue. ErJi et al. (2012) examine the 
non-interest income, namely fee and commission income, exchange gains, investment revenue and other 
income. They use bank data from 1992 to 2009 to investigate how non-interest income affects the mean 
and variation of a bank’s profit in Taiwan’s banking industry. Research show diversification benefits from 
declining covariance between net interest income and non-interest income may exist at the aggregate 
level, but non-interest income also has more variation than net interest income. Their results reject the 
hypothesis that increasing non-interest income shares will improve profitability and diminish risk. These 
studies paint a mixed picture about the performance effects of diversification in banking. As banks had 
initially hoped by joining in or establishing a FHC could realize cross selling synergies, issues which were 
not foreseen, including system and cultural incompatibilities could have caused perceived synergies 
failing to materialize. We try to focus on financial determinants that influence bank’s profitability.  
 
3. Data and empirical model design  
 
Data and Variable Definitions: Given the fact the Subprime Mortgage Crisis has engulfed many countries 
and is unique in terms of wealth destruction, we divide our samples into two time periods to compare the 
before and after crisis determinants of banking performance in Taiwan, covering the period from 2005 to 
2010. We denote periods 2005-2008 as the “Pre-crisis period” and periods 2008-2010 as the “Post-crisis 
period” to see the effect of impact. We include 15 FHCs (including observations for Taiwan Financial 
Holdings for periods 2008-2010, and excluding Waterland Financial Holdings that does not engage in 
banking activities) and 18 independent banks (including observations for Taiwan Bank for periods 
2005-2007) in our sample. In this paper, we employ the CAMEL ratio to investigate the financial 
determinants that affect banks’ performance. The CAMEL ratings system is a method of evaluating the 
health of credit unions by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), which is based upon five 
critical elements of a credit union's operations. Variables definitions are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions 
CAMEL Code Definitions 
Capital Adequacy CA_CAP 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital/  
Risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks 
Asset Quality 
AQ_LOSS Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans 
AQ_IML Impaired Loans/Equity 
Management 
Ability 
MA_NIE 
Total non-interest expense minus total non-interest operating 
income/Total Assets 
MA_IE 
Total interest expense and total non-interest expense/Total 
Assets 
Earning 
Profitability 
EP_INI Net Interest Income/ Total Assets 
EP_FEE Net Fees and Commissions/Total Assets 
Liquidity Risk 
LR_LOAN Net Loans/Total Assets 
LR_LA Liquid Assets/Customer & Short Term Funding 
 
The first element of CAMEL is Capital Adequacy (CA_CAP), which is the standardized requirement in place 
for banks and other depository institutions. The index determines how much capital is required to be held 
for a certain level of assets through regulatory agencies, such as the Bank for International Settlements or 
the Basel Committee. These requirements are put into place to ensure that these institutions are not 
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participating or holding investments that increase risk of default and that they have enough capital to 
sustain operating losses while still honoring withdrawals. Here we use the total capital ratio as our proxy. 
Total capital ratio is the total capital adequacy ratio under the Basel rules. It measures Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital which includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves and the valuation reserves as 
a percentage of risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks. This ratio should be at least 8%. This 
ratio can’t be calculated just by looking at the balance sheet, but has to be calculated internally by the 
bank. At their option, they may publish this number in their annual report. We expect this ratio to have a 
negative relationship with ROA. Asset Quality is the second element of CAMEL which is generally 
associated with credit risk and is related to the left-hand side of the bank balance sheet. Bank managers 
are concerned with the quality of their loans since it provides earnings for the bank. Loan quality and 
asset quality are two terms with basically the same meaning. Government bonds and T-bills are 
considered as good quality loans whereas junk bonds, corporate credits to low credit score firms etc. are 
seen as bad quality loans. Here we utilize the Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans ratio and Impaired 
Loans/Equity ratio as our proxy. Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans ratio (AQ_LOSS) indicates how much of 
the total portfolio has been provided for, but not charged off. It is a reserve for losses expressed as 
percentage of total loans. Given a similar charge-off policy, the higher the ratio, the poorer the quality of 
the loan portfolio will be. We expect this ratio to have a negative relationship with ROA.  
 
Impaired Loans/Equity ratio (AQ_IML) is a proxy set for measuring asset quality of the bank, is calculated 
as impaired loans divided by equity. It has a negative relationship with ROA. Loans and receivables are 
assessed for the impairment at the end of each reporting period. When there is objective evidence that 
one or more events that occurred after the initial recognition of the loans and receivables, and estimated 
future cash flows of the assets will be potentially affected. Changes in the international or local economic 
conditions may also correlate with the defaults on loan and receivables. When not performing for certain, 
the carrying amount of loans and receivables are reduced through the use of bad loans allowance account. 
Once written off, banks will have to make forgoing provisions for the credits deemed uncollectable in 
order to replenish the allowance accounts, therefore decreasing the net income, or even the retained 
earnings of the bank. Impairment losses could also occur, if the difference between the asset carrying the 
amount and the present value of estimated future cash flows less related collaterals and guarantees is 
negative. Thus, the lower AQ_IML, the higher ROA. Management Ability is the third element of CAMEL 
which can be seen as the most qualitative aspect in CAMEL rating. It is the act of getting people together to 
accomplish desired goals and objectives using available resources efficiently and effectively. Management 
comprises planning, staffing, leading and controlling an organization or effort for the purpose of 
accomplishing a goal. Although direct measurements of characteristics do not appear on financial 
statements, we utilize the   burden ratio and the expense ratio proposed by Shen & Chang (2007) as our 
proxy to account for management ability. The burden ratio (MA_NIE) is defined as total non-interest 
expense minus total non-interest operating income, and then divided by total assets. We expect this ratio 
to have a negative relationship with ROA. The expense ratio (MA_IE) is calculated as total interest expense 
and total non-interest expense divided by total assets. We expect this ratio to have a negative relationship 
with ROA. 
 
Earning Profitability is the fourth element of CAMEL which describes the profitability of the bank and 
avoids the volatility of earnings associated with extraordinary items. Many alternative terms for earnings 
are in common use, but the routine earnings or commodity-based earnings that can be achieved by the 
application of assets are our main concern here. We utilize Net Interest Income/ Total Assets ratio and Net 
Fees and Commissions/Total Assets ratio as our proxy. Net Interest Income/ Total Assets (EP_INI) are the 
net interest income expressed as a percentage of the total balance sheet. The higher this figure, the 
cheaper the funding or the higher the margin the bank is commanding. Higher margins and profitability 
are desirable as long as the asset quality is being maintained. We expect this ratio to have a positive 
relationship with ROA. Net Fees and Commissions/Total Assets (EP_FEE) indicates fixed income 
opportunities. The higher is the ratio, the higher stability of the bank. We expect this ratio to have a 
positive relationship with ROA. Liquidity Risk is the fifth element of CAMEL which represents an asset's 
ability to be sold without causing a significant movement in the price and with minimum loss of value. 
Liquidity is not only an indication of the bank’s ability to meet customer’s day to day cash needs and 
respond to sudden cash withdraw, it also refers to a bank's ability to meet its payment obligations, in 
terms of possessing sufficient liquid assets. We here use Net Loans/Total Assets ratio and Liquid 
Assets/Customer and Short Term Funding ratios to account for liquidity. Net Loans/Total Assets 
(LR_LOAN) depicts the percentage of bank assets are tied up in loans. The higher this ratio, the less liquid 
this bank will be. We expect this ratio to have a negative relationship with ROA. Liquid Assets/Customer 
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and Short Term Funding (LR_LA) is a deposit run off ratio and looks at what percentage of customer and 
short term funds could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly, the higher this percentage, the more 
liquid the bank is and less vulnerable to a classic run on the bank. We expect this ratio to have a positive 
relationship with ROA. 
 
The empirical model: A panel dataset contains observations on multiple entities (individuals), where 
each entity is observed at two or more points in time. In other words, panel data allows the simultaneous 
investigation of a system of equations that consider firm-specific characteristics and time changes. By 
combining time series of cross-section observations, panel data not only gives more informative data and 
variability, it also causes less collinearity among variables, and allows more degrees of freedom. The 
methodology employed here is the general panel regression model as below:  
Yit=α＋β1CA_CAPit＋β2AQ_LOSSit＋β3AQ_IMLit＋β4MA_NIEit 
＋β5MA_IEit＋β6EP_INIit＋β7EP_FEEit＋β8LR_LOANit 
＋β9LR_LAit＋εit 
where: 
Y : the dependent variable, here as ROA; 
X : the independent CAMEL variables; 
α : the intercept of the regression line; 
ε : the error term; 
i : the subscript i is the individual dimension and runs over observations,  
i =1,…, n ; n = number of entities (banks); 
t : the subscript t is the time dimension and runs over observations, 
t =1,…, T ; T = number of time periods (years). 
     
With panel data, we also control for factors that vary across entities (banks) but do not vary over time, 
and factors that could cause omitted variable bias if they are omitted. Even if our raw data contains 
heterogeneity within cross-bank units, the techniques of panel data estimation can take such 
heterogeneity into account by allowing for individual-specific variables. Different assumptions can be 
made on the precise structure of the general panel models, the two most recognized are the fixed effects 
model and the random effects model. The crucial distinction between the term “fixed” and “random” 
effects is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the 
regressors in the model. Given a model and data in which fixed effects estimation would be appropriate, a 
test developed by Hausman and Taylor can determine whether applying random effects estimation would 
be almost as good. With the random-effects specification, it is assumed that individual effects are not 
correlated with the regressors, the Hausman test for random effects is as: 
H0: E(uit｜Xit)=0 
H1: E(uit｜Xit)≠0 
If the null hypothesis holds, the coefficients under LSDV (the fixed-effects specification) and GLS (the 
random-effects specification) are consistent and asymptotically efficient, whereas under the alternative 
hypothesis, only the LSDV is unbiased and consistent. We run the Hausman test and find no systematic 
deviation in results between the fixed effect model and the random effect model. In other words, the 
fixed-effect model is much preferred for all models, which may imply the existence of heterogeneity 
among the banks during both the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. The advantage of applying the fixed 
effects regression is not only can we control for the unobserved variables that vary across bank units but 
not over time, but also those that vary over time but not bank units.   
 
4. Results 
 
Descriptive statistics: Given the 2007 Subprime Mortgage Crisis is in terms of wealth destruction, we 
compare the changes and differences of determinants on ROA before and after the financial crisis. Table 2 
presents descriptive statistics of the full sample, covering 15 subordinated banks and 18 independent 
banks in Taiwan. The average of ROA is 0.02, ranging from 5.83 to -5.55. The average of the total capital 
ratio (CA_CAP) is 12.39, ranging from 71.42 to 6.55. The mean of the impaired ratio (AQ_IML) is about 
17.51, ranging from 80.75 to 0.01. The average of the expense ratio (MA_IE) is 0.03, and the average of the 
net interest income ratio (EP_INI) is 1.39. The net loans ratio (LR_LOAN) has a mean of 59.76, ranging 
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from 82.74 to 2.60.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Summary of the Full Sample  
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
ROA (%) 0.02 1.39 5.83 -5.55 
CA_CAP (%) 12.39 6.07 71.42 6.55 
AQ_LOSS (%) 1.39 0.94 6.76 0.12 
AQ_IML (%) 17.51 15.53 80.75 0.01 
MA_NIE (%) 0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.05 
MA_IE (%) 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 
EP_INI (%) 1.39 0.76 5.77 0.12 
EP_FEE (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
LR_LOAN (%) 59.76 14.58 82.74 2.60 
LR_LA (%) 23.20 16.81 139.13 5.71 
Note: CA_CAP is the total capital ratio that is defined under the Basel rules. AQ_LOSS is calculated as 
loan loss reserve divided as gross loans. AQ_IML is calculated as impaired loans divided by equity. 
MA_NIE is the burden ratio, which is calculated as total non-interest expense minus total 
non-interest operating income and then divided by total assets. MA_IE is the expense ratio, which is 
calculated as total interest expense and total non-interest expense divided by total assets. EP_INI is 
calculated as net interest income divided by total assets. EP_FEE is calculated as net fees and 
commissions divided by total assets. LR_LOAN is calculated as net loans divided by total assets. 
LR_LA is calculated as liquid assets divided by customer and short term funding.  
 
The empirical results: Table 3 and Figure 1 depict the change of ROA for subordinated banks and 
independent banks respectively. Subordinated banks in Taiwan have ROA of 0.35, -0.26, 0.62, -0.07, 0.15 
and 0.65 from 2005 to 2010, which all outperformed independent banks and achieved an overall ROA 
mean of 0.24.  
 
Table 3: ROA (from 2005 to 2010) 
ROA 
Full sample 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Overall 
Mean 0.30 -0.31 0.01 -0.42 0.05 0.47 0.02 
St. Dev. 1.29 1.94 1.69 1.20 1.18 0.76 1.39 
Maximum 5.15 5.83 3.46 0.77 2.46 2.99 5.83 
Minimum -2.69 -5.15 -5.55 -5.52 -4.76 -2.57 -5.55 
Subordinated 
Banks 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Overall 
Mean 0.35 -0.26 0.62 -0.07 0.15 0.65 0.24 
St. Dev. 1.81 2.48 1.13 0.73 1.13 0.67 1.43 
Maximum 5.15 5.83 3.46 0.77 2.46 2.99 5.83 
Minimum -2.69 -5.15 -0.96 -1.63 -3.31 0.18 -5.15 
Independent 
Bank 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Overall 
Mean 0.26 -0.36 -0.52 -0.73 -0.05 0.30 -0.18 
St. Dev. 0.62 1.40 1.94 1.46 1.25 0.82 1.34 
Maximum 1.35 1.39 1.34 0.72 0.94 1.12 1.39 
Minimum -1.45 -4.51 -5.55 -5.52 -4.76 -2.57 -5.55 
 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix. Two variables with a correlation coefficient of - 0.73, namely, 
LR_LOAN and LR_LA, are highly correlated. To diminish multicollinearity, we substitute one variable for 
the other. Lastly, using the Hausman test we find no systematic deviation in results between the fixed 
effect model and the random effect model. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Subordinated and Independent banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
      
  CA_CAP AQ_LOSS AQ_IML MA_NIE MA_IE EP_INI EP_FEE LR_LOAN LR_LA 
CA_CAP 1.00  0.47  -0.41  -0.30  -0.10  -0.12  0.00  -0.57  0.72  
AQ_LOSS 0.47  1.00  0.03  0.23  0.36  0.45  0.20  -0.26  0.25  
AQ_IML -0.41  0.03  1.00  0.20  0.33  0.15  -0.11  0.49  -0.35  
MA_NIE -0.30  0.23  0.20  1.00  0.63  0.51  0.18  0.25  -0.34  
MA_IE -0.10  0.36  0.33  0.63  1.00  0.58  0.35  0.14  -0.13  
EP_INI -0.12  0.45  0.15  0.51  0.58  1.00  0.45  0.17  -0.30  
EP_FEE 0.00  0.20  -0.11  0.18  0.35  0.45  1.00  -0.08  -0.11  
LR_LOAN -0.57  -0.26  0.49  0.25  0.14  0.17  -0.08  1.00  -0.73  
LR_LA 0.72  0.25  -0.35  -0.34  -0.13  -0.30  -0.11  -0.73  1.00  
 
Note: CA_CAP is the total capital ratio defined under the Basel rules. AQ_LOSS is calculated as loan loss 
reserve divided as gross loans. AQ_IML is calculated as impaired loans divided by equity. MA_NIE is the 
burden ratio, which is calculated as total non-interest expense minus total non-interest operating income 
and then divided by total assets. MA_IE is the expense ratio, which is calculated as total interest expense 
and total non-interest expense divided by total assets. EP_INI is calculated as net interest income divided 
by total assets. EP_FEE is calculated as net fees and commissions divided by total assets. LR_LOAN is 
calculated as net loans divided by total assets. LR_LA is calculated as liquid assets divided by customer and 
short term funding.  
 
Table 5 shows the empirical results for full sample. The total capital ratio (CA_CAP) and Loan Loss 
Reserve/Gross Loans (AQ-LOSS) are significant at 1% for the entire and pre- and post-crisis periods. The 
burden ratio (MA_NIE) calculated as total non-interest expense minus total non-interest operating income 
and then divided by total assets, a proxy set for measuring management of the bank has negative 
significance in explaining profitability performance for the entire and post-crisis periods. It has the 
implication of saving a dollar equals to earning a dollar for all banks. Two management ability factors, the 
burden ratio (MA_NIE) and the expense ratio (MA_IE), are critical, especially in post-crisis period. Two 
assets-based earnings profitability determinants, EP_INI and EP_FEE, are significant as expected in the 
post-crisis period.  
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Table 5: Empirical results for full sample  
   2005-2010 Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
C -1.961  -0.858  -1.038  
CA_CAP 0.155***  0.132***  0.107***  
 (0.029)  (0.048)  (0.028)  
AQ_LOSS -0.398***  -0.570***  -0.449***  
 (0.103)  (0.162)  (0.128)  
AQ_IML -0.003  -0.011  0.017***  
 (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.006)  
MA_NIE -70.924***  -25.603  -97.516***  
 (8.209)  (17.171)  (10.825)  
MA_IE -12.567  -68.676***  -35.415***  
 (9.574)  (24.899)  (9.438)  
EP_INI 0.300**  0.196  0.950***  
 (0.135)  (0.323)  (0.200)  
EP_FEE 45.182  80.222  120.201***  
 (57.409)  (107.836)  (44.592)  
LR_LOAN 0.014  0.031  -0.001  
  (0.015)  (0.027)  (0.015)  
R-squared 0.83 0.87 0.96 
Adjusted R-squared  0.78 0.77 0.94 
Note: 1. * , ** and ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10% , 5%, and 1% level. Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses. 2. CA_CAP is the total capital ratio defined under the 
Basel rules. AQ_LOSS is calculated as loan loss reserve divided as gross loans. AQ_IML is 
calculated as impaired loans divided by equity. MA_NIE is the burden ratio, which is calculated 
as total non-interest expense minus total non-interest operating income and then divided by 
total assets. MA_IE is the expense ratio, which is calculated as total interest expense and total 
non-interest expense divided by total assets. EP_INI is calculated as net interest income divided 
by total assets. EP_FEE is calculated as net fees and commissions divided by total assets. 
LR_LOAN is calculated as net loans divided by total assets.  
 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the panel data model results for the subordinated banks and the independent 
banks respectively. CA_CAP is defined as the total capital ratio, which is the total capital adequacy ratio 
under the Basel rules. The ratio is designed to ensure banks hold enough resources to absorb external 
shocks to the balance sheets. If CA_CAP shall fall, the appropriation of earnings as cash dividends or other 
assets will be restricted, other than discipline of authorities to the banks. In accordance with legal 
regulations proposed by government officials, raising the CA_CAP may enable new lines of products 
services, obtain permits to investment overseas, and even the ability to merge and acquire other 
companies. Thus, our result of positive significant post-crisis CA_CAP ratio confirms that after the 
financial crisis, such events may enhance and upgrade the bank’s overall operating performance for 
subordinated banks. The asset quality factor, loan loss reserve divided by gross loans ration (AQ-LOSS), is 
critical as well. As predicted, this ratio is significant negative with ROA for both types of banks in the 
pre-crisis-period. Nevertheless, our result shows that subordinated banks have better quality of loan 
portfolios after the crisis, possibly due to more risk- diversification effects. As loan loss reserve ratio is no 
longer an important factor. The rest of CAMEL elements, such as MA_NIE, MA_IE and EP_INI, appear to be 
important financial determinants in the post-crisis period for both subordinated and independent banks.  
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Table 6: Empirical results of subordinated banks 
  Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
C -5.455  -3.505  
CA_CAP 0.086  0.118***  
 (0.086)  (0.034)  
AQ_LOSS -1.569***  -0.244  
 (0.536)  (0.180)  
AQ_IML -0.076*  0.027***  
 (0.041)  (0.009)  
MA_NIE -221.419  -117.498***  
 (129.667)  (15.512)  
MA_IE 102.643  -49.664***  
 (89.115)  (12.756)  
EP_INI 1.497*  1.230***  
 (0.788)  (0.307)  
EP_FEE -5.414  68.401  
 (183.651)  (115.671)  
LR_LOAN 0.057  0.033  
  (0.044)  (0.022)  
R-squared 0.88 0.97 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.94 
Note: 1. * , ** and ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10% , 5%, and 1% level. Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses. 2. CA_CAP is the total capital ratio defined under the Basel 
rules. AQ_LOSS is calculated as loan loss reserve divided as gross loans. AQ_IML is calculated as 
impaired loans divided by equity. MA_NIE is the burden ratio, which is calculated as total 
non-interest expense minus total non-interest operating income and then divided by total assets. 
MA_IE is the expense ratio, which is calculated as total interest expense and total non-interest 
expense divided by total assets. EP_INI is calculated as net interest income divided by total assets. 
EP_FEE is calculated as net fees and commissions divided by total assets. LR_LOAN is calculated as 
net loans divided by total assets. 
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Note: 1. * , ** and ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10% , 5%, and 1% level. Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses. 2. CA_CAP is the total capital ratio defined under the 
Basel rules. AQ_LOSS is calculated as loan loss reserve divided as gross loans. AQ_IML is 
calculated as impaired loans divided by equity. MA_NIE is the burden ratio, which is calculated 
as total non-interest expense minus total non-interest operating income and then divided by 
total assets. MA_IE is the expense ratio, which is calculated as total interest expense and total 
non-interest expense divided by total assets. EP_INI is calculated as net interest income divided 
by total assets. EP_FEE is calculated as net fees and commissions divided by total assets. 
LR_LOAN is calculated as net loans divided by total assets. 
 
Shen and Chang (2007) propose in their paper to investigate whether subordinated banks have 
higher performance than the independent ones in Taiwan. They propose 15 variables in total 
and among them 4 variables are in common with ours, namely the capital adequacy ratio, 
burden ratio, expense ratio and the net interest income divided by total assets ratio. Their 
results show that the capital adequacy ratio and burden ratio are both significant variables, 
while the former has a positive relationship and the latter a negative relationship with the 
bank’s performance. In their sample period starts from 2002 to 2006, they further show 
subordinated banks have higher average capital adequacy ratios than the independent banks 
do, and independent banks have lower average burden ratios than subordinated banks do. We 
find that the subordinated banks have significantly positive asset quality ratios effects in the 
pos-crisis period, confirming what Shen and Chang (2007) find. In addition, before crisis, 
burden ratio is not a critical determinant for subordinated banks. In other words, they have 
better quality of loans than those of independent banks. Contrast to what Shen and Chang 
(2007) find, our results show that the expense ratio has significant negative relationship with 
the bank’s performance for full sample of banks and subset of independent banks in both 
Table 7: Empirical results of independent banks 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
C -1.785 0.229 
CA_CAP 0.213 0.020 
 (0.128) (0.054) 
AQ_LOSS -0.554** -0.478** 
 (0.203) (0.172) 
AQ_IML 0.001 0.015 
 (0.013) (0.009) 
MA_NIE -35.972 -82.119*** 
 (27.816) (15.588) 
MA_IE -58.019** -49.758*** 
 (26.361) (14.890) 
EP_INI 0.318 0.902** 
 (0.579) (0.326) 
EP_FEE -78.953 110.310** 
 (169.037) (53.642) 
LR_LOAN 0.027 0.004 
 (0.037) (0.023) 
R-squared 0.94 0.97 
Adjusted R-squared 0.88 0.95 
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periods in addition to subordinated banks during the period of 2007-2010. We posit that the 
discrepancy might be due to the different time periods in sample. Net fees and commissions 
divided by total assets (EP_FEE) is significantly positive after the crisis for the independent 
banks. The possibility not observing lucrative fee charge appears to be an important factor in 
the subordinated banks in Taiwan might be tough market competition. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The major findings in the paper are as follows. First, our results confirm what Shen and Chang (2007) find 
and the positive significant capital adequacy ratio in the post-crisis period in our sample is mainly driven 
by subordinated banks. One plausible explanation is though higher reserving requirements is at the 
expense of banks, subordinated banks in Taiwan form risk weighted subordinated debt, hybrid capital and 
off-balance sheet asset through more diversified function nature of business. Second, asset quality factor 
has explaining power for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, meaning prevention safety net built 
predominantly for independent banks in refraining from external shocks. Third, net fees and commissions 
divided by total assets (EP_FEE) accounts for the major recovery after the crisis for the independent 
banks. The interpretation for not observing this earning profitability explaining power in the 
subordinated banks in Taiwan may be offsetting sunk costs. Ironically, engaging in the wealth 
management business may not be quite so cost-effective in Taiwan due to market saturation and tough 
competition. Results show that ROA is strongly related to certain CAMEL ratios, such as the total capital 
ratio (CA_CAP), loan loss reserve/gross loans (AQ-LOSS), the burden ratio (MA_NIE), and net interest 
income divided by total assets (EP_INI). Our managerial suggestions for banks in pursuit of profitability 
on assets include distributing less cash dividends and retain more earnings within the bank, or using 
capital injections to plenitude the capital adequacy ratio. As for lowering the burden ratio and net interest 
income to total assets ratio, choosing the right market niche and playing to one’s strength is winning 
strategy. Emphasis on the cost-benefit analysis to reduce unnecessary costs and those that do not 
generate proportionate and apparent profits is bottom line to stay competitive in the market. Reducing 
the impaired loans to equity ratio and the loans to total assets ratio may improve ROA at the cost of 
detaining the net interest income to total assets ratios, thus consequently offset the intended effects. One 
managerial insight for the variables mentioned above, is much needed careful assessment when 
approving loans, that is, taking collateral and credit risk into consideration to assure the quality of loans. 
 
References 
 
Berger, A. N., Demsetz, R. S. & Strahan, P. E. (1999). The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: 
Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future. Journal of Banking & Finance, 23(2-4), 
135-194. 
Chang, M. S. & Elyasiani, E. (2008). Product Diversification and Performance in the Financial Industry: 
FHCs’ Expansion into the Insurance Activities. Meeting of ARIA in Portland.  
Chiou, C. C. (2009). Effects of Financial Holding Company Act on Bank Efficiency and Productivity in 
Taiwan. Neurocomputing, 72(16-18), 3490-3506. 
DeYoung, R. & Roland, K. P. (2001). Product Mix and Earnings Volatility at Commercial Banks: Evidence 
from a Degree of Total Leverage Model. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 10(1), 54-84. 
ErJi, Y., Cheng, M. C., Lee, C. C. & Chen, I. J. (2012). Diversification in Banking: Is the Non-interest Income 
the Answer? The Case of Taiwan Banking Industry. Journal of Business and Policy Research, 7(1), 
1-29.  
Hwang, D. Y., Lee, A. C., Liu, C. C. & Ouyang, L. (2009). Balance Performance Index and Its Implications: 
Evidence from Taiwan’s Commercial Banks. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 
12(1), 27-62. 
Kwan, S. (1998). Securities Activities by Commercial Banking Firm Section 20 Subsidiaries: Risk, Return, 
and Diversification Benefits. Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 98-32. 
Liu, W. C. & Hsu, C. M. (2006). The Benchmark of Financial Development in Economic Growth: The 
Experiences of Taiwan, Korea and Japan. Journal of Asian Economics, 17(4), 667-690. 
Lo, S. F. & Lu, W. M. (2009). An Integration Performance Evaluation of Financial Holding Companies in 
Taiwan. European Journal of Operational Research, 198(1), 341-350.  
Mishkin, F. S. (1999). Financial Consolidation: Dangers and Opportunities. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
23(2-4), 675-691. 
Morgan, D. P. & Samolyk, K. (2003). Geographic Diversification in Banking and its Implications for Bank 
Portfolio Choice and Performance. Manuscript, Research and Market Analysis Group, Federal 
702 
 
Reserve Bank of New York. 
Shen, C. H. & Chang, Y. (2007). Do Financial Holding Company Banks Outperform Independent 
Banks-Correcting Selection Bias by Matching Methods. The15th Conference on the Theories and 
Practices of Securities and Financial Markets. 
Stiroh, K. J. & Rumble, A. (2005).The Dark Side of Diversification: The Case of US Financial Holding 
Companies. Journal of Banking and Finance, 30(8), 2131-2161. 
Templeton, W. K. & Severiens, J. T. (1992). The Effect of Nonbank Diversification on Bank Holding 
Companies. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 31(4), 3-17. 
